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Abstract: This paper claims that the use of the computer as generative methodological tool for 
designing urban and building scenarios (when perceived systematically) is a misnomer, because the 
typical approach does not account for the incompleteness of computational processes. We will argue 
that the computerisation of architectural and urban scenarios with autopoietic and/or artificial life 
simulations does not account for what Edsger W. Dijkstra called “radical novelty”; and Gilles Deleuze 
termed “line of flight”. Typical computational methods do not open up genuine alternatives that produce 
radical morphologies. Our argument is predicated on the dominant notion of computation as opposed to 
a critique of computation per se. A critical analysis of the perception of novelty is made to support our 
view, and its connection with the incompleteness of axiomatic systems is explored in relation to three 
phases of cybernetic enquiry. Our argument draws on the ontologies of Alfred North Whitehead and 
Gilles Deleuze, which we utilise to reorient computational design to emphasise the potential of 
generating radical novelty and identify the inherent locus therein a matter of nonhuman decision-
making. 
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1 Introduction 
Typical understanding of computation is based on the abstract machine invented by British 
mathematician Alan Turing. Barry Cooper, also a mathematician, argues “Turing 
computation does not create anything that is not there already in the initial data” (Cooper 
2012). Why then do we compute if nothing new is produced through computing? We will 
argue in this paper that the manner in which we conceive computation is fundamental to the 
use, and role, of computers; particularly if they are to be employed as a device to extend 
creativity (as tends to be the case in design) and that if computing is to generate novelty 
then typical methodologies need to be reworked to account for the emergence of new 
information within the methods employed. The issue is not only pertinent to the development 
of computing and the question of process in computer science, but also to the proliferation 
of computational logic into observing and controlling human and nonhuman activities.  
In a paper celebrating the centenary of the life and work of Alan Turing, Cooper asks 
whether ‘information can increase in computation?’ (Cooper 2012). A negative response to 
this question renders the mathematician’s ambition of a closed system, whereby everything 
could be decided and computed, possible. In other words, a totalised axiomatic system is 
defined. A static closed theory of everything for all mathematics that would be like a 
dictatorship (Chaitin 2006). Consequently, the question “why do we compute?” becomes 
intrinsically concomitant with the notion of novelty.  
In the search for novelty, computation has been introduced into architectural and 
urban design methodologies to enhance the design process and extend creativity. Based on 
the rationalisation of experts systems (i.e., knowledge based models (Gero and Lou Maher, 
1988)), the adaptability of autopoiesis (Lynn, 1999) and artificial life (i.e., generative models 
(Coates 2010)) novel solutions to previously solved problems, novel morphologies and 
spatial organisations have been claimed. This has taken place over the last forty years since 
computers, and more specifically computer logic, was introduced into design (Alexander 
1964 and Negroponte 1970). How then is it possible to argue for novelty through a process 
that doesn’t produce novel data; as Cooper argues? We do not claim that the above 
mentioned pioneers in the field of computational design methodologies have not extended 
creativity or introduced some sense of novelty in their designed artefacts. Neither have we 
dismissed the sense of novelty conveyed to the designer engaging with such 
methodologies. What we argue is that novelty in computational design, which tends to be 
conceived of as a condition external to computation, must in fact be a product of computing: 
i.e. inherent in the process occurring in the machine. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the notion of novelty as it is conceived through 
parallel advances in cybernetics, design and computation over the last sixty years. Since 
Cybernetics was an interdisciplinary effort to understand and control being in action and 
communication (Wiener, 1948) we unfold this story in three phases. Within each phase we 
identify convergent lines with respect to cybernetics, design and computation and their 
account with novelty. Our perception of novelty is informed mainly by Edsger W. Dijkstra’s 
(1988) distinction between novelty and radical novelty and Gilles Deleuze's (1987) account 
on “absolute detteritorialisations”. 
The three different phases of cybernetics we refer to are not the classic stages; being 
first-order cybernetics (Wiener 1948), second-order cybernetics (Foester1995) and what 
Glanville implies as ‘without-orders’ (2006). We use those put forward by Luciana Parisi and 
Tiziana Terranova (2000), which correlate the cybernetic project to the concepts of 
turbulence, entropy and information.  For each of the three phases we identify a primer 
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concept that characterises the effort within the cybernetic epistemology in order to account 
for novelty. This identification is informed by Katherine Hayles (1999), and thus 
‘homeostasis’, ‘autopoiesis’ and ‘emergence’ reveal specific approaches and attitudes 
towards entropy, information and, eventually, novelty. 
The paper is focused on post-war developments. However, we feel a brief connection 
between developments in logic, formal axiomatic systems and their ingression in the world 
of design is required in order to set the scene and identify how current computational design 
models have developed. We thus start with a definition of novelty before providing a brief 
introduction to the rationalisation of knowledge in respect to two central events at the 
beginning of the 20th Century. The first is the 1910 publication of Principia Mathematica, by 
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, the second being the 1920’s Vienna Circle. 
The impact of those two events on the world of design is crucial, resonating throughout the 
post-war period. It is from this point that we start to unfold the three phases of Cybernetics, 
followed by a critique on notions of homeostasis, autopoiesis and emergence and respective 
computational models used in computational design. We make use of Peter Cariani’s (2008) 
distinction between combinatorial and creative emergence, and John Protevi’s (2009) 
schema of synchronic, diachronic and transversal emergence. Our critical position towards 
the existing computational paradigm in respect of its account of radical novelty will allow us 
to proceed by proposing a diagrammatic computational model for design.        
2 Novelty and Radical Novelty  
Edward W Dijkstra (1988) presents two forms of novelty, and identifies different ways to 
cope with them. The first, ‘novelty’ (which we will term relative novelty) is of slow and 
gradual change. In dealing with ‘relative novelty’ we build metaphors and analogies to link 
old with new, whereby the less familiar is correlated with the familiar. Radical novelty is what 
Dijkstra terms that which is a break, a disruption, or ‘sharp discontinuity’ with an existing 
habitual pattern. If coping with relative novelty means to stretch and adapt vocabularies 
within metaphors and analogies then to cope with radical novelty requires “creating and 
learning a new foreign language that can not be translated into one’s mother tongue”(p. 2). 
Novelty, he claims, is not something present in a previous scenario or condition constructed 
by a purposeful machine.
1
 It is something that emerges out of current (and a potential 
product of previous) circumstances which an observer cannot account for by deconstructing 
the machine or analysing the trajectory of states before the change arose. We thus look to 
the work of John Protevi (2009) and Peter Cariani (2008) to gain a firmer basis for the 
occurrence of novelty in complex systems. 
John Protevi distinguishes between ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ emergence. He 
states “synchronically emergent structure is that which enables focused systematic 
behaviour through constraining the action of components” while diachronic emergence “is 
the production of novel functional structures”
 
(Protevi 2009, p8). In other words synchronic 
emergence refers to the actual performance of the system in real time. Peter Cariani (2008) 
makes a distinction between ‘combinatoric’ and ‘creative emergence’. Combinatoric 
emergence refers to “a set of primitives that are combined in new ways to form emergent 
structures” (Cariani 2008, p.7). The fixed set in this sense defines a space of possibilities 
that is also fixed even if new combinations of existing primitives take place. On the other 
                                                        
1 We use the term systemic-assembly in this text to denote an entity with a given organisation and established state of 
affairs.  
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hand creative emergence assumes the creation of a new primitive that restructures the 
possibility space of the system. Cariani, in a similar way to Protevi, proceeds to the 
distinction between combinatoric and creative emergence.
2
 
For Deleuze radical novelty is the result of cleaves present in a self-replicating 
systemic-assembly which enables that assembly in every instance of the time to open up to 
radical new potentialities. He names this process as “absolute deterriorialisation”. Deleuze’s 
use of the term deterritorialisation stems from the conception of a system as a territory; as 
having a given organisation and fixed state of affairs. It is in this sense that a systemic-
assembly is a territory and consequently is caught in processes of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialization. If the first term denotes an escape or departure from a given territory, the 
second denotes the constitution of new relations among the elements of the deterritorialised 
systemic-assembly. In that sense deterritorialisation is inseparable from processes of 
reterritorialization.  Not every process of deterritorialisation however opens up the systemic-
assembly to radical novelty. For this reason Deleuze constructs an elaborate schema of 
deterritorialised processes in order to reveal specific particularities and so to avoid 
generalisations. Deleuze’s discussion on deterritorialisation takes place in regards to two 
distinctions. In the first, deterritorialisation can take a negative or a positive form while in the 
second can acquire a relative or absolute movement. The first distinction is a direct 
reference to the notion of feedback in complex systems. A Deterritorialisation is negative 
when the process of reterritorialisation obstructs the opening of the systemic-assembly to 
new potentialities and recuperate it by a conservative process of reterritorialization. The 
positive form consequently is acquired when new relations are formed and new adaptive 
techniques are learned. However, what complexifies further the account of radical novelty in 
any kind of systemic-assembly is the second distinction. A distinction between relative and 
absolute movement of deterritorialisation. The two types of movement are correlated with 
Deleuze’s ontological distinction between the actual and the virtual. It is suffice for the 
moment to say that relative deterriorialisation operates at the level of actual elements of the 
systemic-assembly. It never leaves the corporeal order of the system. On the contrary the 
absolute movement of deterritorialisation takes place in an incorporeal order of the 
potentialities that Deleuze names as virtual. In an incorporeal order that is yet immanent in 
the material and corporeal order of the systemic-assembly. It is this absolute movement that 
Deleuze will name as the ‘absolute line of flight’ the radical opening of the systemic-
assembly to radical new potentialities. In this sense the absolute deterritorialisation is an 
immanent vector of transformation; an immanent process that accounts for radical novelty. 
Radical novelty therefore finds its genesis in an order of reality different from the actual 
state of affairs concerning the systemic-assembly in its environment. It as an immanent yet 
transcendental force of transformation, that finds itself in a relation of reciprocal 
presupposition with the actual assembly.  
3 Origins of Axiomatisation   
The history of logical reasoning conjoined with empirical observation starts with Auguste 
Comte. However, it is Principia Mathematica, one of the most important projects of the 20th 
Century that exemplifies the role of science and logic in formulating the industrialising world. 
                                                        
2 It is worth mentioning though that for Peter Cariani Emergence is more “than simply the creation of new structures of 
behavior. It also includes the formation of fundamentally new organisation of matter - life - and the formation of 
fundamentally new informational processes -- nervous systems and minds -- and the concomitant appearance of a 
new aspect of the world -- conscious awareness.” (Cariani, 1998 p.1) 
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It is in this ambitious project of Russell and Whitehead in which axiomatics became the 
origin of a certain conception of the world that renders its influence in developments in 
architecture and urbanism as well computation. It has significant influence on design with 
the inclusion of members of Logical Positivism in the Bauhaus curriculum and on 
computation with the apparent significance given to Turing’s work, which became the 
foundation of modern computing, and thus the basis for computational design thinking (see 
Coates 2010). It is with Principia Mathematica that we identify the origin of a split. On the 
one side we have axiomatics and determinacy , (which continues the premise of Principia 
Mathematica), seeking rationalisation and on the other we have problematics and 
indeterminacy, which breaks with crystal clear axioms while requesting more of human 
insight and intuition. The former takes a direction towards general/universal truths that in 
their turn are imposed on the material world. The latter tends towards the induction of local 
and simple rules governing the interactions of elementary components of any kind of 
systemic-assembly observed in the bio-physical and material world.  It is the historical 
events surrounding Principia Mathematica that we unfold in search for radical novelty. 
Comte’s Positivism was introduced in urbanism and architecture in the 19
th
 century by 
Ildefons Cerda and Gottfried Semper. The Vienna Circle introduced logical positivism into 
these field in 20
th
 Century.  A mutual influence between the Vienna Circle and the Bauhaus 
is evident in two events.
3
 The first regards the Wittgenstein Haus and the second concerns 
the integration of Rudolf Carnap’s thinking, into Bauhaus’ curriculum. The Wittgenstein Haus 
and Carnap’s involvement in Bauhaus testify a distaste towards metaphysics and decoration 
and a redirection of the then contemporary world towards a scientism that unites all aspects 
of life; whilst at the same time excluding the entropic tendency of complex systems. This trail 
of thinking, highly influenced by logical positivism, is evident in the way architects organise a 
building and urban planners devise the city to manage space and effect order and control. It 
is the era of streamlined planning that can be found from the linear city plans of the Russian 
disurbanists (Mumford 2002) to the work of Le Corbusier (1946) and the orientation of the 
Bauhaus. 
The Vienna Circle (also known as the Ernst Mach Society) was formed in Vienna in 
1922 just after the completion of Principia Mathematica and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s influential 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The aim of this group of philosophers was to establish 
principles of logic and science. The consequence of which had far reaching influence in the 
sciences and humanities. The Bauhaus became a testing ground for the application of 
logical positivism in design (Galison, 1990) and the school hosted lectures by Rudolf 
Carnap; one of the key theoreticians of the Vienna circle. His “The Logical Construction of 
the World” (Carnap, 2003) oriented the schools philosophical direction. The work of Adolf 
Loos at that period proffered the same philosophical orientation in design, sharing, in this 
sense, the new anti-philosophical movement heralded by Wittgenstein and integrated later 
by Logical Positivism. “You are me!” Loos said to Wittgenstein (Galison 1990, p.725). Loos’s 
and Wittgenstein’s critique on the ‘superfluous’ is culminated in the Ornament and Crime 
(Loos 1998) and Metaphysics and Crime as a kind of text that Wittgenstein had written 
(Galison, 1990, p.725). 
                                                        
3 For a detailed account for this relationship see the work of Peter Galison Aufbau/Bauhaus (1990)  
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4 Incompleteness and Incomputability    
Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica project sought to establish a conceptual 
machinery to define mathematical truths; free of ambiguities, contradictions and 
undecidables. Principia Mathematica was an example of an axiomatic system of crystal 
thought for almost twenty years, which lead to David Hilbert making three claims:  
 
 Mathematics is complete: every system can either be proved or disproved. 
 Mathematics is consistent: a statement is either true or false, and therefore mathematics 
is free of contradiction.  
 In mathematics (or in any axiomatic system) there are definite methods that can be 
applied to a statement to decide whether that statement is provable or not.  
 
Hilbert’s belief that mathematics could solve all the problems and make the world knowable 
was so strong that he expressed it by saying: “We must know. We shall know” (Cooper, 
2004, p.3). However, the Austrian logico-mathematician Kurt Gödel, who was a student in 
Vienna at the time of the Vienna Circle, questioned not only the Principia Mathematica but 
any axiomatic system being a universally truth system. Gödel's Incompleteness 
Theorem proved definitively that Principia Mathematica or any such system could never 
achieve the author’s ambition, or indeed fulfil the claims of Hilbert.  
Kurt Gödel, and Alan Turing later destroyed Hilbert’s certainty and any hope for 
axiomatics to be rendered complete, consistent and decidable. Gödel proved that all 
axiomatic systems are incomplete and inconsistent. Turing later devised a thought 
experiment, known as Universal Turing Machine, to prove that undecidability is inherent in 
axiomatic systems. Two conclusions stemming from Turing’s experiment are that: 
 
 No formal language can express all possible proofs: there are, therefore, incomputable 
problems, and 
 All programming languages are capable of expressing essentially any algorithm. 
 
Instead of focusing on the limits that Turing's paper places on computability scientists and 
mathematicians turned their focus towards the second conclusion; that of universality. The 
algorithmic theorist Gregory Chaitin comments on Turing's Universal Machine:  “[o]n the one 
hand he taketh away, on the other he giveth” (2010, p1). “The concept of computability” 
Cooper argues “is basic to modern science, from quantum gravity to artificial intelligence. It 
is also relevant in the everyday world, where it is useful to distinguish problems that are 
merely difficult to compute in practice from those that are intrinsically impossible with any 
machine” (2012, p.465). The latter are incomputable problems. Chaitin (2006),4 Cooper 
(2012) and Soare (2009) argue about the importance of incomputability in Turing’s work. 
They point specifically to Turing’s lesser known oracle-machine, which was like his Turing 
machine except it presupposed the presence of an oracle. In other words a black box that 
could compute the uncomputable, and thus solve the unsolvable problems that Turing 
machines could not. “Let us suppose we are supplied with some unspecified means of 
solving number-theoretic problems; a kind of oracle as it were … this oracle cannot be a 
machine.” (Turing, 1939, p.172-173). 
                                                        
4 Gregory Chaitin doesn’t make an explicit reference to the oracle Machine but he implied it  in his description of his 
Omega number he states: “Omega’s properties suggest that mathematicians should be more willing to postulate 
new axioms, similar to the way that physicists must evaluate experimental results and assert basic laws that cannot 
be proved logically” (Chaitin, 2006, p.76) 
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The idea of the o-machine “was to allow the machine to compute relative to a given 
real, which may or may not be computable” (Cooper 2004, p.6). The concept of the o-
machine makes possible the introduction of intuition in the computational process. Turing 
was clear about the role of intuition in his work. It was only a small paragraph in his text 
‘Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals’ in which he claimed:  
“Mathematical reasoning may be regarded … as the exercise of a combination of … 
intuition and ingenuity… In pre-Gödel times it was thought by some that all the intuitive 
judgments of mathematics could be replaced by a finite number of … rules. The 
necessity for intuition would then be entirely eliminated. In our discussion, however, 
we have gone to the opposite extreme and eliminated not intuition by ingenuity, and 
this in spite of the fact that our aim has been in much the same direction” 
(Turing 1939, p.134-5)  
However, the theory of computability flourished while that of incomputability has been 
neglected (Longo 2010). It can therefore be argued that it is the coupling between logical 
positivism and the selective appropriation of universality, (stemming from the conclusions 
Turing drew of his Universal Machine) that define not only the development of computation 
and consequently the inception of cybernetics, but also the typical conception in 
architectural discourse that refers to the cybernetic view of the organism as an analogy for 
designing: ie the systemic conception of buildings and cities. 
5 Cybernetics  
Cybernetics
5
 was the name for an interdisciplinary research project aiming to study the 
control and communication in animals and machines through feedback functions. The 
epistemology of Cybernetics though will be developed through broad and abstract issues of 
communication and control by feedback processes in machines, organisms, and social 
organisations. At the onset of Cybernetics we argue that we witness a change from the 
concept of discipline to that of control. The logic of axioms in the pre-war period suggested 
the logic of ‘discipline’ that in the age of Cybernetics will give its place to the logic of 
‘control’.  
 
Figure 1: Preconceived Forms discipline bodies.   
                                                        
5 Cybernetics as a research project does retains a scientism present in the agenda of Positivism that was looking into 
synthesising all sciences. As Hayles claims: “ [In Cybernetics] Wiener entertains the possibility that cybernetics has 
provided a way of thinking so fertile that it will allow the social and natural sciences to be synthesised into one great 
field of inquiry”. (1999, p.108) 
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Part of this shift was effected by the futility, proffered by Gödel’s and Turing’s proofs, to 
construct a crystal clear, complete and consistent axiomatic system free of indeterminacies. 
Incompleteness, uncertainty and randomness are immanent in formal systems; as is entropy 
in bio-physical systems. Claude Shannon’s Information Theory will become the second 
factor responsible for the shift from discipline to control. It is the positive charge that 
Shannon assigned to entropy by equating it with information that renders entropy as the 
origin of life and not as its unavoidable heat-death.
6
 Entropy becomes Information, a positive 
force that drives systems to their self-organisation and their increase in complexity. By 
encountering and managing randomness and entropy, the molds that ward off and discipline 
bodies in a world constructed through the thermodynamic perception give their place to 
continuous modulations. These modulations operate through trial and error on the 
elementary parts of the bodies allowing them to self-organise and acquire higher levels of 
complexity. This same perceptual transition can be traced in the domain of the actual 
devices. We can observe this change even at the level of machines, for example:  the 
Babbage machine gives space to the Universal Turing Machine and ENIAC (the physical 
implementation of Turing’s Universal Machine). 
It is a similar path that architecture and urbanism traces after the Second World War. 
The notions and methods of cybernetics inform the work of many architects and urban 
planners.  The Metabolists, Constant Nieuwenhuys and Cedric Price were influenced by 
cybernetics with varied political orientations while approaching the notion of control (of the 
turbulent entropic world) differently. An intellectual attitude of that time that refused to 
embrace any metaphysics of life and the formalisation/axiomatisation of all the processes 
has influenced a whole generation of architects, since Christopher Alexander’s Pattern 
language. Alexander (1978) and Negroponte’s (1970) influential work accompanies the 
twists and turns of logical positivism prompting further rationalisation. Rationalisation led into 
an approach to design that reveals its connections with axioms through the use of 
mathematics while introducing computational methods at the core of design. Architecture, in 
the era of cybernetics, leaves its mechanical conception of the machine and opens it up to 
the idea of turbulence, with an implicit emphasis on control. In the next sections we will 
follow closer that relationship between the machine and entropy in relation to control and 
novelty. 
5.1 Homeostasis 
Norbert Wiener is strongly influenced by Willard Gibbs’
7
 probabilistic understanding of the 
entropic world. He was concerned with the prospective of the ‘heat-death’ of the planet due 
to its entropic tendency and he assumed that in the midst of chaos and turbulence there are 
islands of order where “[l]ife finds its home” (Wiener 1989, p12). Cybernetics abstracts 
reality from the messiness of matter and perceives life as an informational pattern
8
. 
Biological organisms and mechanical devices in a cybernetic framework will become 
machines
9
 capable to react to a stimuli that disturbs and threatens their unity and their 
                                                        
6 This shift is traced and mapped in the book of N.Katherine Hayles(1999) “How We became PostHuman” and in the 
joined article by Luciana Parisi andTiziana Terranova(2000) entitled “Heat-Death”.    
7 Weiner (1989) will write about Gibb’s understanding of Entropy: “... Gibbs had that this probability tended naturally to 
increase as the universe grows olders. The measure of this probability is called entropy, and the characteristic 
tendency of entropy is to increase.”(p. 12)   
8 Pattern and Chaos will become two notions that their charge will be exchanged in the course of the second half of 
the 20th century. If Pattern was the positive request in the birth of Cybernetics, The “local enclaves” or “islands” in 
the midst of whirlpools as Weiner wanted it   
9 It is the anti-entropic processes of that allow Wiener to name mechanical and biological systems as machines. 
“When I compare the living organism with such a machine, I do not for a moment mean that the specific physical, 
chemical, and spiritual processes of life as we ordinarily know it are the same as those of life-imitat-ing machines. I 
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boundaries. Entropy is the measure of disorder for Wiener and he associates information 
with the measure of organisation (1958). Negentropy, the opposite of entropy, is equated 
with information. It can be argued that Wiener still conceives those machines in a 
thermodynamic context with a tendency towards the heat-death terminal condition of 
sameness and disorder. The protection of the organisation of those machines is achieved by 
homeostatic mechanisms provided by feedback functions and managed through continuous 
modulations. In this first instance of cybernetics entropy is warded off.    
 
Figure 2: Diagram of the first phase of Cybernetics: Closed Boundaries   
Spatial organisation in architecture and urbanism emphasised the impetus for homeostasis. 
The Metabolist movement embraced the departure from the mechanical world of the Modern 
Movement. Kishu Kurokawa, one of its key members, states that his own thinking at that 
time was an attempt “to understand the shift from a mechanical to biodynamical 
age.”(Koolhaas & Obrist 2009, p19)  The Metabolists coupled this shift with traditional 
Eastern philosophy; that sees permanence through change. Kenzo Tange’s radical proposal 
for the post-war Tokyo (Lin 2010) embraced mobility and communication as the driving force 
behind the project, using biological analogies to justify his proposals for the city’s radical 
transformation.
 
Figure 3: Tokyo Plan and Biological Growth (Lin, 2010)  
Computation at this point is perceived as a closed system. A formal language able to 
describe any bio-physical process, which could be turned into an algorithm without having to 
be acted upon by the external environment. This is a closed, self-sufficient set of 
programmed instructions able to predict the future behaviour of system in terms of pre-set 
probabilities. It is on such computing machine that anti-aircraft machinery was built on in 
                                                                                                                                             
mean simply that they both can exem-plify locally anti-entropic processes, which perhaps may also be exemplified in 
many other ways which we should naturally term neither biological nor mechani­cal.”(Wiener, 1958, p.32)  
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Wiener’s time.
10
 “[C]omputing machine whose instructions are all set forth in advance on the 
"tapes," and which has next to no feedback mechanism to see it through the uncer-tain 
future” (Wiener, 1989, p. 57). A closed axiomatic system that operates on fixed set of data 
effectively pushes incomputability away from computation. This can suggest an almost 
homologous perception between incomputability in computation and entropy in physics 
governed by thermodynamic laws. 
Change and novelty in the birth of Cybernetics are implied concepts buried under the 
notion of homeostasis. Still though, the first instance is highly conservative. Novelty appears 
as progress and learning in the writings of Wiener but is always relative to an existing 
organisation and reluctant to the radical transformations of it through the process of 
“metamorphosis” (Wiener, 1989, p.53). Small changes that build on past experiences allow 
machines to learn, to adapt, without dissipating in the entropic universe. The model of 
learning or better that of adaptation in machines is transposed by the models of ontogenetic 
and phylogenetic changes in organisms
11
. It is in this sense that any behaviour based on the 
‘law of requisite variety’ (Ashby 1957) is equated with adaptation, rather than radical novelty. 
Deterritorialisation of the machine is therefore relative, momentary and negative. Processes 
of reterritorialisation secure the return to a homeostatic posture. The purpose of learning in a 
machine is the preservation of its identity. This paradigm is continued in the second phase 
of Cybernetics, but through major conceptual advances (such as autopoiesis) the process of 
self-making becomes an important concept in the attempt to accommodate the significance 
of the observer.     
5.2 Autopoiesis 
The notion of homeostasis although present in the second phase of cybernetics, moves to 
the background. The concept of Autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980) takes centre 
stage. Autopoiesis in this sense can be considered as an intriguing concept to look to and to 
embrace as a means to engage with biological creativity or novelty, because it demonstrates 
how a living system is created, and is self-generating (Maturana and Varela 1980). An 
autopoietic system according to Maturana and Varela has no other purpose than to persist, 
and if the dynamic circularity is interrupted then it disintegrates.
12
 Coupled to its environment 
an autopoietic system draws from and thus conveys to its environment, meaning the system 
has identity, because it is different from that which surrounds it – for it must be different to 
exist. The boundary between system and environment is therefore pivotal for the autopoietic 
understanding of the organism. The boundary is a ‘component’ of the system which is 
distinguished through its ‘form’, which is determined by its structure and the difference 
between itself and the environment (Luhmann 2006). The boundary between the self and 
other is essential for the system to exist. “[The] point of departure for all systems-theoretical 
analysis must be ‘the difference”. The way in which systems are perceived through the 
concept of autopoiesis is spatial, in that the components of a system are a complex of 
                                                        
10 That was the problem that Wiener faced during the war “...  in the pursuit of a target as rapid as an airplane, there is 
not time for the computer to take out his instruments and figure where the plane is going to be. ' All the figuring must 
be built into the gun control itself. This figuring must include data which depend on our past statistical experience of 
airplanes of a given type under varying flight conditions. The present stage of anti-aircraft fire consists in an 
apparatus which uses either fixed data of this sort, or a selection among a limited number of such fixed data. The 
proper choice among these may be switched in by means of the voluntary action of the gunner.” (Wiener, 1989, p. 
62)  
11 In Cybernetics Wiener will write: “Both ontogenetic and phylogenetic learning are modes by which the animal can 
adjust itself, to its environment”. (1961, p. 169) 
12 Maturana and Varela will argue that the purpose of the autopoietic system is “to produce and reproduce the 
organisation that defines them as systems. Hence that not only are self-organising but also are autopoietic or self-
making” (Hayles, 1990, p. 10). 
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interactions distinguished by their structure which determines a closed unity. A boundary 
condition is thereby defined, through which the system is structurally coupled with, but has 
autonomy from, the environment. The system is intrinsically different and being 
distinguishable has identity. The concept may be seen to share similarities with the notion of 
buildings as systems of spatial relations, and one may at this point be drawn into thinking 
about social systems and architecture autopoietically (Luhmann, 1986; Schumacher, 2011). 
Autopoiesis is an intriguing concept because it’s central concern echoes what Henri 
Lefebvre argued about space; that it is something which is produced as well as productive 
(1995). Space is thus perceived as an active phenomenon which manifests itself and 
persists. It is this aspect which offers architects a new conception of space and the capacity 
to generate spatial formations. 
 
Figure 4: Diagram of the second phase of Cybernetics: Negentropy and Self-Organisation  
The influence of autopoiesis can be traced back to what became known as blob architecture 
(Lynn, 1999). Patrick Schumacher (2011a) recognises the work of Lynn as the precursor of 
his parametricism movement. If the Struggle of Wiener was to retain order in the midst of 
entropic flows then Schumacher's struggle is how to demarcate architecture with a 
comprehensive and unified theory in the midst of the dissolution of the grand narratives. An 
ordering principle that will retain the identity of the discipline of architecture while at the 
same time will become a common communicative system within large practices.  
Parametricism and Schumacher reawake the ambitions of Modernism to converge the world 
of architecture in a closed organisation; this time not fixed and static but dynamic and 
adaptive. To integrate everything in a convergent, non-conflictual way, to naturalise change, 
relativising novelty and maximising the effectiveness of performance appears to be 
strategies that are introduced into architecture and urbanism via parametricism. It is this 
emphasis on the self-maintenance and survival that guides Schumacher's conception of the 
autopoiesis of architecture and the autopoietic architecture and the position to state that 
architecture should have “the autonomy to adapt to an environment and to stay relevant in 
it.”(Schumacher 2011a). Autopoietic organisation “constitutes a closed domain of relations” 
that are “specified only with respect to the autopoietic organization that these relations 
constitute” Maturana and Varela 1980, p.88). Computation in design followed the same 
tendency. Closed, although temporal, and topological systems prevail in the use of 
computers in architectural and urban design.  
Computation can be thought as the reiterative application of the same invariant 
function that describes a fixed topological organisation and produces variable structures of 
the same organisation. An invariant mathematical function secures the organisational 
closure of the algorithm and in the most linear perception of processing it maps the inputs 
into outputs. The incomputable nature of computation again is ignored. Captivated with what 
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is computable within the closed systems of invariant functions architects explore that world 
of digital architecture. Architectural animations, such as that of Greg Lynn’s ‘Animate Form’ 
(1999) and Schumacher's ‘Parametricism’ (2009) seems to render visual the autopoietic 
attitude of computational processes.  
Figure 5: Kartal Pendik Masterplan (Zaha Hadid Architects, 2006)    
 
That second phase of cybernetics negates the role of the entropy through processes of self-
organisation and self-making and it is focused on the constitution of an identity and 
autonomy.  In any other case as the autopoietic theory suggests there is only death and 
dissipation. Novelty is a notion that is not accommodated by autopoietic theory. The 
deterritorialisation is negative and its movement relative to the extent that the purpose of 
retaining the same organisation of the machine is a priority. It takes therefore a further, third 
instance of Cybernetics to account for the unsuspected complexifications and unexpected 
transformations that emerge out of coupling of heterogeneous systems.       
5.3 Emergence 
Hayles (1999) in her periodization of Cybernetics argues that the autopoietic circle turns into 
a spiral and the concept of autopoiesis gives primacy to ‘emergence’ in the third phase of 
Cybernetics. The entropic environment now affects the autopoietic entity but the feedback 
loop, previously focused on the homeostasis, now points also towards the production of 
difference through self-organisation. In Bateson’s words, it is “the difference that makes a 
difference” (2000, p 459). The small deviations are quickly amplified and the complex 
feedback functions can now be recognised as positive. The system leaves its comfort zone 
and is compelled to create a novel behavior. Deviation, mutation and variation don’t 
necessarily lead to entropic death as the previous instances of cybernetics were suggesting 
or implying. On the contrary, for this third phase entropy is being dissociated by Wiener’s 
thermodynamic reading to become information; according to Shannon’s understanding. As a 
result entropy is conceived to be the origin of life. As Hayles states: 
“Entropy will be reconceptualised as the thermodynamic motor driving systems to self-
organisation rather than as the heat engine driving the world to universal heat 
death[...] Chaos went from being associated with dissipation in the Victorian sense of 
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dissolute living and reckless waste to being associated with dissipation in a newly 
positive sense of increasing complexity and new life” (1999,  p102-103).  
Information at critical points is capable to generate systematic behaviour that is supervened 
by functional structures in a circular causality. Upward causality generates capacities for the 
system as a whole that are not possessed by the individual components, and downward 
causality affects the behaviour of the components and becomes the ‘constraint’ that enables 
the capacities of the whole. 
 
Figure 6: Diagram of the third phase of Cybernetics  
Computation in design is biologically inspired in this third phase of Cybernetics, operating 
bottom up. Artificial life simulations become generative; following Langton’s claim that life 
operates at the edge of chaos (1995). The idea of the unexpected pattern out of the self-
organisation of computational agents becomes the new computation model. Even the shift 
from the procedural logic of the algorithm to the object-oriented programming makes 
apparent that change of focus from the invariant function to the generative aspect of the 
interactions with local rules. Recursivity and synthetic simultaneity or pseudo-parallelsism 
underlie the set-up of the interactions for most of artificial life computations. Multi-agent 
based models and cellular automata operate at the edge of chaos. The initial instability 
provided by the heterogeneous field of data is the originator of the turbulence that drives the 
self-organisation of the computational model. If we consider the computational models as 
complex dynamic systems then it can be argued that the phase space of the computational 
system is already given as a possibility space. That means that certain attractors have been 
distributed in the phase space where the model will end up constituting in this sense a 
behaviour in the form of a pattern. The positive feedback that we saw that govern those 
computations have also the capacity for new patterns to emerge. That means that the 
system adapts or learns. In other words either the system moves to a different attractor or a 
new attractor is added in its phase space. In this sense we do argue that we still have a 
relative novelty in terms of Dijkstra but a creative emergence in terms of Cariani since a new 
primitive, in Cariani’s terminology, has been added into the system. The move to another 
attractor or the creation of a new one still accounts for small incremental changes. 
A series of design projects have included Artificial Life computational models in their 
methodologies for the sake of novelty of the emerged outcome. Kokkugia’s Prairie House 
project (Snooks 2012) is a computational project that introduces Mutli-agent models in the 
design methodology.  
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Figure 7: Prairie House project: Multi-Agent Computational Model (Kokkugia, 2012)  
This strategy operates as “a negotiation between local interactions of multi-agent models 
and the global evaluation of structural analysis” (Snooks 2012, p61). The behaviour that 
emerges from the upward causation is not only ‘constrained’ by the constituted functional 
structures but also from the application of gravity that affects “the flow of load through the 
form that is continuously analysed at the global level” (Snooks 2012, p61). Structural 
performance is fed back into the system and the agents adapt their behavior based on 
heuristic structural rules. Novelty in Kokkugia’s project is effected through the process of 
adaptation on small incremental changes in the synchronic level. Agents do not learn by 
their previous experiences but rules are handed to them by designer’s knowledge. 
 Figure 8: Three phases of Cybernetics: Entropy / Novelty  
6 Computational Models: a critique   
The three phases of the history of the second half of the 20th century within the framework 
of cybernetics and the respective treatment on entropy and the incomputable should be 
considered not in a very strict and isolated way. Overlapping and transferences of concepts 
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pass from one phase to the other. It is as if, in the three distinct phases, elements and 
concepts are passed into every new phase while at the same time old principles are 
repeated. Three different computational models emerged in the three phases described 
above.  
 
 The knowledge based model in which a closed set of procedures operates on a closed set 
of data (Gero and Lou Maher, 1988) which leaves no room for new elements to be 
created.   
 The autopoietic model (Lynn, 1999; Shumacher, 2010), is an invariant procedure that 
operates on a dynamic set of data which it reconfigures. Novelty, in this sense, is 
apparent since what is produced is always the result of the procedure. The outcome of the 
autopoietic model is, however, synchronically emergent (Ireland and Zaroukas, 2012).  
 The emergence model, in contrast, is open ended. A closed set of computational 
components which operate on, and produce, a set of data through interaction. (Coates, 
2010) Novelty, is thus considered to be relative to the procedure, because it is effected by 
interaction between components that operate at every instance on the data set provided.  
 
In the emergentist paradigm we are faced with two problems regarding radical novelty. The 
first has to do with the fact that architects are falling sort by stopping only on what emerges 
out of components’ interactions in a synchronic level, repeating in this sense the problematic 
aspect of autopoietic computational model. The other problem has even deeper affiliations 
with the theory of autopoiesis of which is concerned with persistence.  Novelty, thus, is 
conceived to emerge only as encroaching perturbations that challenge system’s structure. In 
other words they agitate and inflict disruption on a system in order that it may shake up and 
reorganise. The problem here is that the homeostatic purpose of systems is implied. 
Kokkugia’s project discussed above reintroduces homeostasis through the back door. It 
would seem that systems tap on novelty when they are forced to change. Shaviro points out 
that this implicit homeostatic conception of organic being sees novelty as something that 
organisms do “when they are absolutely compelled to, and as it were in spite of themselves” 
(Shaviro, 2009, p. 93).  
Radical Novelty we argue in the next section is immanent in biological systems and 
living processes, which we will show is viable computationally.  As expounded by Deleuze’s 
deterritorialisation, radical novelty has to presuppose relative novelty. We look to Whitehead 
who make novelty central to his process philosophy; which reiterated by Deleuze. 
7 Reductive model the locus of radical novelty  
Deleuze in his collaborative work with Felix Guattari asks “Is there absolute 
De[territorialisation], and what does absolute mean?” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 509) As 
mentioned earlier Deleuze devises a schema to articulate different means by which a 
systemic-assembly may open up to new potentialities. The most radical dimension of his 
schema is his idea of absolute deterritorialisation. In other words the opening of the 
relations, and the conditions of, a systemic-assembly. The absolute, as described above, 
refers to a form of movement which is qualitatively different from relative movement.  With 
relative movement the relations of a systemic assembly untie in such a way that they 
maintain reference to their previous condition.  Absolute deterritorialisation on the other 
hand opens a systemic-assembly to influences its organisation previously prevented and 
therefore becomes difference-referenced. It becomes alien-referenced. Deleuze, in his 
geological terminology, will name the excluded world: ‘earth’. It is in this sense that we 
understand a systemic-assembly as territory, its opening up as deterritorialisation and the 
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absolute movement of its escape as communication with the earth. Systemic-assemblies 
are not totalities. On the contrary, a systemic-assembly has cleaves and is incomplete, 
inconsistent and incoherent. Even the most rigid can be opened to new potentialities. 
Vectors, untying given relations and established states of affairs, are inherent within a 
systemic-assembly, which emerge, either because of internal dynamic movement or 
because it is open to, and thus forming new assemblies with another systemic-assembly. 
Deleuze argues that, either, the connections in a given systemic-assembly, and given 
state of affairs, are qualitatively different or they are intertwined with other assemblies 
causing different systemic-assemblies to emerge through transversal communications
13
. We 
can therefore identify two distinct possibilities for vectors of deterritorialisation. To explain 
the first one we need to move beyond topology, as discussed above with regard to the 
autopoietic conception of systems, to account for variation and difference in a relation. 
Topological configurations that arise out of component interactions, do not take into account 
the quality of spatial relations. Spatial relations are more varied than the typical topological 
focus allows for. We must move beyond topology to incorporate the mereological aspect of 
parthood (Varzi, 1996).  By allowing for parthood we enable variance into the system and 
thereby allow for differences to occur, on the basis that ‘a difference is a difference that 
makes a difference’; which ‘perceived over time’ is what we call ‘change’ (Bateson, 2000). 
Difference is required to alter or affect new states and create asymmetry in the system. 
                                                        
13  Systemic-assemblies are always caught in relations with other assemblies reconstituting a new space of 
potenitalities for the newly created assembly.. In this sense machinic assemblages are not hybridisations of the 
actual, phenomenal part of the systemic-assemblies but the meshing of their potentialities. It is in this sense that 
communication between potentialities is transversal. 
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Although Deleuze would account for difference in terms of ‘intensive differences’, that 
means through the mathematics of differential calculus, the reading of parthood relations 
through formalistic approach will allow us  to extend our search for novelty from biological 
organisms to computational code. A similar shift is evident in Francisco Varela’s Principles 
of Biological Autonomy (1979), in which he explains his attraction to dynamical systems 
modelling, whilst at the same time recognising such an approach as limited to the molecular. 
He therefore turns to algebraic/formal recursive systems. By the time the organism is 
perceived as an informational pattern (after the birth of cybernetics) formal ontology, and 
modelling, seems to be an adequate approach to discuss radical novelty. Formal ontology 
and modelling were first introduced by the philosopher Edmund Husserl (1970) as 
framework to “study formal structures and relations – above all relations of part-whole” 
(Smith 1998, p.20). Whitehead’s “theory of extensions” (1978, p.281) formalises those 
relations while provides a framework for an ontology and the means for modelling. It is this 
same tension between the two ontological schemes of Deleuze and Whitehead; that has 
appeared in computational design and marks a turn from molecular to formal ontology. Both 
ontologies question the notion of “limit”; in terms of, either the entropic organism or the 
incomputable. We therefore put forward two schemas (to be read in parallel) to which 
account for radical novelty, as immanent in both biological and computational domains.  
Figure 9: Two Diagrams for the genetic locus of Radical Novelty. Gilles Deleuze, Alfred N. Whitehead   
In Whitehead’s (1978) process philosophy there are ‘actual entities’ and ‘eternal objects’. 
Actual entities are, “the final real things of which the world is made up” (p. 18). Thus we 
should not limit our understanding of the actual entities only to the corporeal entities. 
Computational data sets and abstract procedures can also be conceived as such. In order to 
avoid the confusion we can use Whitehead’s alternative terminology for these entities as 
‘actual occasions’. “Each actuality is essentially bipolar” (p. 108). They have two poles: one 
that is ‘mental’ and another that is ‘physical’. The latter is what allows the actual occasions 
to sense their world, they are responsible for what Whitehead calls ‘prehensions’. The 
former is where the ‘eternal objects’ find their reality. Eternal objects are “pure potentials for 
the specific determinations of fact, or forms of definiteness” (p. 22) and their functioning in 
“the self-creation of an actual [occasion] is their ‘ingression’ in the actual entity”. The ‘eternal 
object’ of the ‘mental pole’ as it ingresses in the self-making of the actual entity in every 
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instance affect the parthood relations. It is for this reason that parthood relations introduce 
variance into the system and therefore effectuate a novel orientation in every single 
moment. The fact, that those pure potentials that provide new orientations to the system, are 
not coming from a transcendental domain but are immanent in the topological relations allow 
us to name them dark orientations. The information that passes from the abstract pole to the 
physical pole and gives the latter an orientation is named ‘decision’. The fact that this 
decision is provided by an abstract and alien entity allow us to name it as alien decision. The 
two poles are connected and communicate in a quasi-causal relation breaking the causal 
circularity of Autopoiesis. A circularity that has as a purpose the conservation of the 
organisation and therefore the identity of the systemic-assembly. The quasi-causality allows 
the introduction of orientations and repositions the physical pole into a novel fresh start. In 
biological sense this moves away from the neo-Darwinian Synthesis that sees innovation of 
the organic being as an inescapable compulsion triggered by some external pressure 
(Shaviro, 2009, p. 93). In every interaction of concrete entities there is always a decision 
that although it is alien to the physical pole that is to interaction between corporeal 
components is still immanent in it. The alien decision therefore is what Whitehead called 
‘final reaction’:  
“The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the efficient causation 
be pushed in the determinations of components of concrescence – … – beyond the 
determination of these components there always remains the final reaction of the self-
creative unity of the universe. The final reaction completes the self-creative act by 
putting the decisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the determinations of efficient 
cause” (Whitehead 1978, p 47). 
It is at this decisive moment in which an alien decision supervenes the efficient causality, 
where radical novelty enters into the systemic-assembly. “Decided conditions are never 
such as to banish freedom. They only qualify it. There is always a contingency left open for 
immediate decision” (Whitehead 1978, p. 284). And so Deleuze will add a new concept to 
encapsulate that contingency: “It is the mute witnesses or the dark precursors which do 
everything – or at least, it is in these that everything happens” (2004a, p.319). The mental 
and physical pole can find their homologies in Deleuze’s ontological scheme as virtual and 
actual domains where Deleuze emphasises time instead of spatial relations as locus of 
novelty. The virtual supervenes the actual domain in a quasi-causal relation and gives it 
orientation allowing in the same time contingency to be introduced at the paradoxical 
coexistence of the instance of moment named ‘chronos’ that opens up to the unlimited time 
of ‘Aion’. In Deleuze's terms, that will entail the restructuring of the potentialities of the 
systemic-assembly in the unlimited time and the distribution of new potentials -- new 
singularities and new dark precursors. Deleuze’s dark precursors are therefore the 
incorporeal entities that select which of the potentialities will become actual at every 
instance of time. That opening to the unlimited time though takes place as a paradox in the 
instance of time. It is in every instance that those new potentialities will supervene afresh the 
process towards a new actual systemic-assembly. We would like to think that by shifting the 
attention from emergence to the decisions 'made' by a dark precursor this restores novelty 
on the basis of the  existence of a systemic-assembly in the presence of contingency 
immanent in the ‘earth’. This is the absolute deterritorialisation that entails radical novelty. 
There is though a second presupposition in Deleuze’s process of deterritorialisation 
which has to do with the deterritorialisation that opens up systemic-assemblies; the 
transversal communication with other deterritorialised systems at the level of potentialities 
where a new systemic-assembly emerges with a new space of potentialities. John Protevi 
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(2009) names this type of emergence transversal. Transversal emergence is the result of a 
transversal communication that takes place at the moment where two systemic-assemblies 
are meshing their potentialities while also creating new by forming in this sense a new 
systemic-assembly. This meshing invokes a merging, a construction of a new virtual domain 
effectuating radical novelty in the constituted systemic-assembly. If those assemblies are 
computational then it is within this transversal communication that the incomputable ingress 
in the process. The actual dataset, if we are allowed to rephrase Deleuze, will become the 
‘earth’. The ‘oracle’ kicks in and computation continues based on relative given real number. 
It is the ingress of the incomputable in the computation that effectuates radical novelty in the 
form of a speculation by the oracle and constructs in this sense a radical abductive 
computational model that we call raductive.  
 
Figure 10: An ontological diagram for a Raductive Computational Model  
It is by Actuating Auto(poiesis) that a diagram of raductive computational model is proposed 
and radical novelties can be re-established, immanent, at this time, within the computational 
process. The crucial alien decision effectuated by the ingress of the incomputable can 
redirect a computational process as a speculative force for a spatiotemporal construct yet to 
come.  We therefore propose a diagram of a reductive computational model that in contrast 
to Autopoietic computational model, to Parametricism and to Emergentist models, embraces 
radical novelty as inherent in systemic-assemblies instead of just accounting for relative 
novelty as compulsory adaptations and self-modulations. If Deleuze’s diagram would allow 
us to think radical novelty in the intensity of the biophysical world then Whitehead’s 
adequately introduces novelty in the axiomatic domain of computation. 
8 Conclusion  
We have questioned the apparent faith in the generative capacity of computing for design 
and argued that this capacity is unquestioned. Rather, it is accepted and no accounting for 
the presence or emergence of novelty is made within the community; or at least is evident. 
The paper started with an account of novelty, to define the notion, in an attempt to render its 
dimensions visible. The Deleuzian input, with note to his concept of deterritorialisation and 
his account of the ‘absolute’ was pivotal to this definition, particularly with regard to the 
pattern of thought apparent therein with Whitehead.  Our review of the notion of novelty was 
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coupled with the story of computation, which we considered broadly in terms of how notions 
of logic, rationalisation, formalisation and axiomatisation influenced computing and its 
application for design. Key events that have influenced this trajectory where pinpointed:  
Principia Mathematica, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and Turing’s theory of 
incomputability were identified as seminal events that prompted fundamental limitations with 
regard axiomatic systems and computation. Three phases of Cybernetics were surveyed 
with respect to the key focus informing these phases: entropy, computation and the 
consequent repercussions in urban and architectural design. Each phase was 
complemented with a diagram showing how control, entropy and potentials of emancipation 
are distributed within reality.  Our critique was then directed, not at computation per se but 
the unquestioned capacity to generate novelty. By resorting in a philosophical line of 
thinking that links Whitehead and Deleuze we proposed a diagram of a computational 
model. The diagram of the reductive model takes into account an extra domain of reality that 
is in mutual presupposition with any actual dataset in computation. However the peculiar 
communication between those two domains of reality allows incomputable data to enter in to 
the existing dataset and to affect the next step of computation. Indeterminacies in this sense 
enter computation as alien decisions that provide dark orientations to the next step of the 
computational systemic-assembly. We offer two conclusions, which may be deemed starting 
points for further consideration. (1) Radical novelty is found at the level of the alien decisions 
and dark orientations at the reciprocal presupposition between ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’, ‘mental’ 
and ‘physical’. (2) Radical novelty, as Deleuze and Whitehead point to, is immanent in every 
systemic-assembly (see figure 10). Moving beyond autopoiesis, we seek to break the 
identity of such systemic-assemblies to compute the incomputable and think the 
unthinkable; to speculate! 
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